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Pricing Decision with Conspicuous Customers: Quick Responses 
versus Value-Added Services
Abstract: In order to eliminate the negative effects of customer strategic 
behavior, retailers often adopt quick response or value-added services. While in a 
luxury market with conspicuous customers, retailers’ pricing decisions of these two 
strategies become more complicated. This paper studies a supply chain with a retailer 
serving a mixture of conspicuous and ordinary strategic customers. We develop three 
models so that the retailer provides i) neither quick response nor value-added services; 
ii) only quick response; iii) only value-added services. Subsequently, we analyze the
impacts of conspicuous customers on quick response and value-added services by
pricing and strategy comparisons. The model further extends to the situation including
both strategies. The results show that, firstly, when the proportion is less than a
threshold, the retailer should adopt a low price strategy, and vice versa. Besides, the
quick response could induce the retailer to adopt high price while value-added
services inhibit it. Secondly, the customer conspicuous behavior can motivate retailers
to provide quick response and inhibit their value-added services. Finally, by observing
the retailer’s decisions when they can adopt two strategies simultaneously, we find
that the existence of quick response can amplify the benefits of value-added services.
Keywords: pricing policy; behavioral operations management; retail supply chain; 
conspicuous customers
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of the global economy and the improvement of 
living standards, luxury consumption has increased drastically in recent years (Zhan 
and He, 2012). Similar to fashion goods, luxury goods are not durable and therefore 
are sometimes for sales. For example, luxury brands such as Louis Vuitton, GUCCI, 
among others, have several discount seasons each year, including summer discounts 
in July and August, "Black Friday" and Christmas sales. Some customers are willing 
to wait till the discount seasons to purchase products (Adegeest, 2018). This is called 
customer strategic behavior, which may reduce a company's revenue (Aviv and 
Pazgal, 2008). Therefore, in order to eliminate customer strategic behavior, retailers 
often use two strategies: quick response or value-added services (Cachon et al., 2011).
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Quick response is an operational strategy that increases supply flexibility by 
reducing lead times (Cachon and Swinney, 2009). It is not only beneficial for 
companies who integrate producing and selling activities, like ZARA (Rohwedder 
and Johnson, 2008), but also useful for companies with solely retailing business 
(Yang et al., 2015), for example, H&M is outsourcing production to independent 
suppliers (H&M Group, 2019), but it is still famous for its fast-responding supply 
chain. Retailers with quick response can adjust order quantities based on timely 
collected market information. In spite of the extra quick response cost, it reduces the 
necessity of over-order and discount (Yang et al., 2015). Studies have shown that 
quick response is an important mean to mitigate customer strategic behavior (Shen 
and Su, 2007). At present, quick response has gradually gained the attention and been 
adopted in luxury fashion retailers. For example, SMCP's two luxury brands, Sandro 
and Maje, re-examined the business model in difficult sale periods, adopted quick 
response strategy and finally transformed to “accessible luxury” which exhibits both 
characteristics of luxury and fast fashion goods (SMCP Group, 2019). In the case of 
SMCP, although the production is outsourced, and only sale remains in-house (SCMP 
Group, 2019), its quick response strategy enables quick replenishment to prevent from 
out-of-stocks when the retail link faces shortages. Currently, the SMCP's cycle time is 
about 3 months comparing to 6-12 months of traditional luxury brands (Liu, 2017). 
Hence, the number of stockouts has been significantly reduced. 
Providing value-added services, on the other hand, can increase the customers’ 
valuation and purchase intentions, and make them less willingness to wait for a sale if 
items have a risk of stockout (Cachon et al., 2011). Value-added services include 
activities that enhance product design and visibility of brands such as better 
packaging, brand story, customers service before and after sales, advertising, and 
product placement (Zhao and Wang, 2015). For example, L&C Leather Workshop 
opens stores in high-end clubs or high-end shopping malls, provides Japanese-style 
private butler services and invites customers to participate in the services in a regular 
basis. In order to attract more high-end consumers, L&C Leather Workshop has also 
expanded its service scope and gradually cultivated high-end service functions such as 
flight service and yacht interior (Bonnie Luxury Care Training, 2014). 
As we described above, quick response and value-added services address 
customer strategic behavior concerns with different principles. Specifically, quick 
response reduces the chance of sales in discount seasons by quickly matching supply 
and demand (Yang et al., 2015). Therefore, it prompts customers to purchase at a full 
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price (Cachon et al., 2011). Whereas value-added services increase the customers’ 
valuation of the goods, which increases the customers’ expected loss if stockout 
occurs in discount seasons (Cachon et al., 2011), thereby it may change the customer 
strategic behavior.
Quick response and value-added services can both eliminate customer strategic 
behavior. Different luxury retailers have adopted different strategies. For example, 
traditional luxury brands such as Louis Vuitton and GUCCI emphasize brand value 
and focus on providing value-added services. However, more luxury brands learn 
from fast fashion and adopt the strategy of quick response, such as Sandro and Maje. 
They have combined the characteristics of the high-end luxury brands and fast fashion 
brands and form a new mode called “accessible luxury”. This phenomenon has 
motivated us to investigate the following question: in the context of strategic 
customers, should luxury retailers learn from fast fashion brands and make the 
transition to "accessible luxury", or continue to emphasize value-added services?
An important factor influencing luxury retailers' choice of these two strategies is 
customer conspicuous behavior, which is very common in luxury industry (Chiu et 
al., 2018). Customers with conspicuous behavior are more inclined to purchase 
immediately when goods are first launched in order to satisfy their psychological 
needs. And if the possibility of stockout in the second period (discount seasons) is 
large, the utility of purchasing immediately in the first period (at full price) of the 
conspicuous customers will be higher. Therefore, customer conspicuous behavior 
greatly affects the luxury retailer's pricing strategy under the strategies of quick 
response and value-added services, which in turn affects the luxury retailer's choice of 
these two strategies. Some scholars explored the impacts of quick response or/and 
value-added services in the context of customer strategic behavior (Cachon et al, 
2011; Yang et al, 2015), but with the focus on fast fashion retailers. Their study 
results cannot be applied to luxury retailers facing with conspicuous customers. 
Therefore, we combine quick response, value-added service and customer strategic 
behavior together with the characteristics of the luxury industry—customer 
conspicuous behavior, to study the impact of customer conspicuous behavior on the 
luxury retailer’ pricing decision and the optimal strategy, and subsequently to provide 
guidance for decision making in luxury retailers.
Based on the above background, as the main part of study, we develop three 
models dedicating to three scenarios for the retailers to provide i) neither quick 
response nor value-added services; ii) only quick response; and iii) only value-added 
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services. We aim to answer three research questions: First, how do the retailers 
optimize pricing decisions when both customer strategic behaviors and conspicuous 
customers exist? Second, what impacts do the conspicuous customers have on the 
strategic choices of quick response and value-added services? Third, how should the 
retailers choose the optimal combination of pricing decision and strategy with 
different proportions of conspicuous customers?
 In extension, we establish the fourth model that considers both value-added 
services and quick response as a complementary analysis. This is based on the 
assumption that the company has sufficient resources such as funds and manpower to 
implement both strategies simultaneously. For example, Burberry, a luxury brand in 
the UK, while emphasizing value-added services (Burberry, 2019), adopted quick 
response and launched the mode of 'See Now Buy Now' (Bianca, 2017).Therefore, we 
further study the impacts of value-added services and quick response on pricing 
decisions, and investigate the relationship between these two strategies.
This study contributes the followings to the literature and practice. Firstly, 
compared with the existing studies (Fisher and Raman, 1996; Dumrongsiri et al., 
2008; Cachon et al, 2011; Tereyağoğlu and Veeraraghavan, 2012), this paper provides 
an in-depth investigation of the pricing decision with highlights on conspicuous 
customers, quick response and value-added services. The results show that with the 
conspicuous customers, the quick response could induce the retailer to adopt high 
price while value-added services inhibit it. Therefore, this study enriches the related 
theoretical research and provides the decision basis for luxury retailers with 
conspicuous customers.
Secondly, this paper innovatively discovers the impact of conspicuous customers 
on the quick response and value-added services strategies when customers have 
strategic behaviors. Specifically, when luxury retailers sell products, the more 
conspicuous customers, the more they are inclined to choose quick respond rather 
than value-added services. This finding complements the literature on customer 
strategy behavior (Su and Zhang, 2008; Feng and Zhang., 2017).
Thirdly, our research offers important guidance for practice. For luxury retailers, 
both quick response and value-added services can improve profits when costs are 
sufficient low. However, considering the conspicuous customers, when their 
proportion in a market is high, retailers should adopt a quick response strategy and 
timely replenish goods with market demand, so as to reduce the possibility of selling 
goods at a reduced price, and adopt high-price strategy to meet the needs of 
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conspicuous customers.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 presents a literature 
review, and Section 3 provides the problem description and model building; Section 4 
offers pricing decision analysis; Section 5 further investigates the quick response and 
value-added services strategies; Section 6 exhibits the results of numerical simulation; 
Section 7 is model extension and finally Section 8 draws study conclusions, 
management insights and limitations. 
2 Literature review
This paper mainly involves three aspects, namely, customer behavior, quick 
response, and value-added services. Therefore, the literature review will focus and 
elaborate the progress of relevant research, and correspondingly the research gap.
2.1 Conspicuous customers and strategic customer behavior
As the market economy has become more active, customer behavior has an 
increasing impact on the supply chain and companies’ decision-making. There are 
several studies that pertain to conspicuous customers, and most of them adopt 
methods of economics analysis. Tereyağoğlu and Veeraraghavan (2012) analyzed 
production and pricing decisions of a retailer with the consideration of conspicuous 
customers. Most recently, Chiu et al. (2018) studied the optimal advertising budget 
allocation in luxury fashion markets with social influences. They considered two 
groups of conspicuous customers and investigated the optimal customer portfolios and 
budget allocation problem using the mean-variance (MV) framework. However, the 
interaction of pricing and the conspicuous customers is rarely studied; the gap will be 
filled with this study.
The customers' strategic behavior has a mechanism of affecting pricing decisions 
and profits of a supply chain. Coase (1972) first researched such customer behavior; 
he concluded that a delay in customer purchase would reduce the earnings of the 
company. In recent years, many scholars have conducted research on customer 
strategic behavior and have expanded the topic into the field of supply chains. The 
existing research in this direction mainly focuses on supply chain pricing and supply 
chain performance. For example, both Su and Zhang (2008) and Feng et al. (2017) 
studied supply chain coordination based on customer behavior strategy. In addition, 
Yang et al. (2015), Ziani et al. (2015) studied the profits of supply chain members in 
different modes with strategic customers. In summary, the research on customer 
strategic behavior mainly focuses on its negative impact on supply chain profits and 
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Quick response is an effective way to deal with the uncertainty of supply and 
demand and is applied by many enterprises in practice. Many scholars have conducted 
studies on quick response, but most have studied the value of quick response and its 
impact on supply chain members. For example, Fisher and Raman (1996), Cachon et 
al. (2011), and Yang et al. (2015) all studied the value of quick response with respect 
to customers behavior. They showed that when the costs of quick response are low, 
the value of quick response in a centralized system is higher than in a decentralized 
system. However, some authors claimed that quick response may reduce the retailer's 
profit. For example, Cachon et al. (2011) suggested that quick response may increase 
or decrease the retailer's profit depending on the market environment. In addition, 
some scholars have studied the supply chain coordination mechanism with quick 
response, using a series of contracts (such as a wholesale price contract or a revenue 
sharing contract) and other policies (such as quantity commitment) to realize supply 
chain coordination (Iyer and Bergen, 1997; Choi and Chow, 2008).
Among the existing literature, the most relevant research to our study is Cachon 
et al. (2011), who studied the value of quick response combined with customer 
behavior strategy. They found that quick response can mitigate the adverse effects of 
strategic customers. Unlike their research, this paper faces the challenge of including 
conspicuous customers and quick response on the retailer's pricing decision; at the 
same time, we compare the strategies of quick response and value-added services. 
Therefore, our study adds new knowledge in literature.
2.3 Value-added services
As an important way for enterprises to convince customers and to increase their 
competitiveness, value-added services have drawn a wide attention from industry to 
academia. In terms of value-added services, the existing research can be divided into 
several types, according to the different entities that provide activities associated with 
value adding. 
The first type pertains to value-added services provided only by manufacturers. It 
includes customer service before and after sales, product advertising, and delivery 
services. Hsu et al. (2006), Lin et al. (2007), among others, studied the impact of 
manufacturers’ different delivery strategies, delivery efficiencies, and delivery times 
on consumer satisfaction and manufacturers’ profit, in order to achieve coordination 
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between delivery costs and services. Generally, most scholars focus on the delivery 
service provided by manufacturers, and few studies focus on other types of 
value-added services such as return or replacement products service, information 
consultation, after-sales service. The second type of research involves value-added 
services provided by retailers. This includes better packaging, gifts, product 
advertising, and product placement (Dumrongsiri et al., 2008; Ferno et al., 2010). 
Dumrongsiri et al. (2008) studied the effect of retailer service levels and customers’ 
sensitivity on supply chain profitability in a two-channel supply chain. Ferno et al. 
(2010) used the Stakelberg game to study how to choose the right service level in 
order to maximize profits. There are also some researchers studied value-added 
services which are provided at the same time in two different channels. For example, 
Chiang et al. (2007) studied the possibilities and methods of replacing value-added 
services between these two channels. Generally, the existing research on value-added 
services focuses on channel selection or determining the service level to achieve the 
maximum return. Value-added services are seldom associated with conspicuous 
customers in literature; the gap will be filled by this paper.
2.4 Summary of the literature
Table 1 lists the most relevant papers discussed in the literature review. It is clear 
that the existing research on conspicuous customers mainly focuses on retailers' 
pricing and production decisions. However, the effect of retailers' choices (such as 
value-added services and quick response) on pricing decisions has not been studied 
comprehensively. Therefore, this paper will focus on this important research gap.
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3 Problem description and model building 
3.1 Problem description
This paper studies a supply chain consisting of a retailer and a group of strategic 
customers. Strategic customers are further divided into two groups: conspicuous 
strategic customers (hereinafter referred to as conspicuous customers) and ordinary 
strategic customers (hereinafter referred to as ordinary customers). The retailer needs 
to determine selling prices and order quantity. The customers determine the time point 
of purchasing, according to the prices offered at different times. The unit wholesale 
price of the product is . The entire selling season is divided into two periods. The w
first period sells products at a full price , and the second period uses a discounted p
price  (this assumption follows the phenomenon of discount seasons every year, s
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such as July and Black Friday). 
We assume that all customers are forward-looking. They know that products may 
be sold with discount price in the second period and therefore consider deferring 
purchases to maximize their utilities (Ye and Sun, 2016). But for luxury goods, the 
retailers sometimes supply with shortage, in order to encourage consumers to 
purchase as soon as possible, i.e. purchase in the first period in our setting. So, in the 
second period, products may be out-of-stock. We assume that the consumer's 
estimated probability of stockout in the second period is . Furthermore the 
ordinary customers' valuation of the product is , and ( ) denotes the v r r v
customer’s reservation price. The retailer, on the other hand, cannot observe either 
customer’s reservation price  or estimated probability of stockout in the second r
period . We use rational expectations for analysis, that is, the retailer will estimate 
 and , and the retailer's expectations are consistent with what actually happened. r 
The rational expectation approach is widely used in the study of strategic customers 
(Ye and Sun, 2016). Therefore, we use  to represent the actual probability of 
stockout for the second period, and the retail price  is equal with the customers’ p
reservation price .r
The ordinary customers' valuation of the product is , which is different from v
the conspicuous customers. This is due to the greater psychological satisfaction when 
a conspicuous customer receives a luxury product in its new launch, which is called 
the flaunting effect. Therefore, the conspicuous customers' valuation of the unit 
product will be higher than the ordinary customers' valuation. In addition, the 
conspicuous customers' valuation is related to the probabilit  of stockout for the 
second period . A high value of  will enlarge the conspicuous customer's  
valuation of product, thus the conspicuous customers' valuation becomes , v k
where  is the sensitivity coefficient for conspicuous customers concerning the k
stockout in the second period. We have .0k 
The proportion of conspicuous customers is defined as , . The  (0,1) 
customers determine the purchase period by comparing the consumer surplus obtained 
in the first and second period. Consumer surplus value refers to the difference 
between consumers’ willingness to pay and the price actually paid in purchasing (Hitt 
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and Brynjolfsson, 1996). Consumer surplus reflects the psychological satisfaction. 
This measure is widely used to indicate the consumer purchase decisions. 
Furthermore, the market demand faced by the retailer is assumed to be a random 
variable  with the mean , the distribution function and the probability density d 
function are represented as  and , respectively. The notations used in this  F x  f x
paper are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Parameters of this paper.
parameters Description
d Market demand
( )f x Probability density function of market demand, 2~ ( , )X N  
( )F x The distribution function of market demand,  0 1F x 
p The unit retail price
Q Order quantity
r The reservation price of customers in the first stage 
s The discounted price in the second period
i Subscript, =1, 2, 3, 4 represent the Models 1, 2, 3, 4, respectivelyi
j Subscript, =1, 2 represent the cases where all the customers or j
only the conspicuous customers buy in the first period, respectively
, , ij ijp ijQ
The profit, price, order quantity of the retailer of Model  in the i
case , superscript * indicates the optimal decisionj
v Ordinary customer’s valuation (willingness to pay) for unit product
w The unit wholesale price
 The proportion of conspicuous customers, (0,1) 
qw The cost of quick response
 The probability of out of stock in the second period
 k The sensitivity of conspicuous customers on out-of-stock 
e Service level when providing value-added services
 The parameter of customer utility increase when providing 
value-added services
 The parameter of cost increase when providing value-added services
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3.2 Basic model (model 1)
In this section, we first analyze the intertemporal decision-making of different 
customers in the market, then construct the basic model without considering quick 
response and value-added services. This basic model serves as a benchmark for later 
analyses.
For ordinary customers, if a purchase is made in the first period, the consumer 
surplus is . If a purchase is made in the second period, considering the possible v p
stockouts, the consumer surplus is . Therefore, the indifference   1v s  
condition between the first and second period is .  1v p v s    
If the conspicuous customers buy in the first period, they obtain products in the 
first hand, and there is a greater satisfaction. The consumer surplus is . v k p 
However, if conspicuous customers wait for until the second period, they cannot 
obtain products in the first hand, the flaunting effect does not exist anymore, so the 
consumer surplus of the second period is  (Tereyağoğlu and   1v s  
Veeraraghavan, 2012). Therefore, the indifference condition for buying in the first 
and second period is .   1v k p v s     
If the retailer only has one opportunity for placing an order, two possible optimal 
pricing options are available: (1) Set a low price as , so both the   1v v s   
conspicuous and ordinary customers will purchase in the first period; (2) Set a high  
price as , so conspicuous customers will buy in the first period   1v k v s    
and ordinary customers will wait until the second period.
The retailer’s expected profit when all customers buy in the first period:
.         (1)           11 min , min ,Q pE d Q s Q E d Q wQ    
The retailer’s expected profit when only conspicuous customers buy in the first 
period:
.       (2)      12 min , min ,Q pE d Q s Q E d Q wQ     
In the expected profit functions, the first term is the sales revenue in the first 
period, the second term is the residual revenue in the second period, and the third term 
is the procurement cost.
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3.3 Model with quick response (model 2)
When a retailer has quick response ability, in addition to one ordering 
opportunity before the selling season, the retailer has another order opportunity in the 
beginning of the first period as the market demand updates. The unit cost of the first 
order is , whereas the unit cost of the second order is , where  refers to w qw w qw
the extra cost due to quick response. If the initial order quantity is less than the market 
demand, a second replenishment is needed. The replenishment quantity is  d Q
( ) when all customers (only conspicuous customers) buy in the first period. d Q 
The retailer’s expected profit when all customers buy in the first period:
.        (3)           21 +qQ p w E d w E d Q s w E Q d
      
The retailer’s expected profit when only conspicuous customers buy in the first 
period:
.     (4)           22 +qQ p w E d w E d Q s w E Q d   
      
In the expected profit functions, the three terms on the right refer to the profit by 
meeting the demand of customers in the first period, the additional cost due to quick 
response, and the profit obtained in the second period, respectively.
3.4 Model with value-added services (model 3)
This section assumes that the retailer provides value-added services to 
customers, and the service level is . In this paper, we assume  exogenous for e e
following three reasons. Firstly, many value-added services provided by luxury 
retailers are unified in the luxury brands, for instance, extending the return and 
exchange time to 30 days (e.g. GUCC, LV); highly qualified staffs to provide high 
standard service. Secondly, some value-added services provided by luxury retailers, 
such as maintenance and repair, require investment in personnel and equipment at 
early stage. Therefore, retailers cannot easily change their value-added services at 
operational stage once early investment is made. Lastly, our research aims at studying 
the retailer's optimal pricing decisions under the two strategies of quick response and 
value-added services, and further investigating the optimal strategy. This assumption 
is essential in highlighting our research focus.
The unit cost of value-added services is . Similar linear cost assumption can e
be found in Huang et al. (2017). In addition, since  is an exogenous variable, the e
linear cost assumption does not affect the final result of this paper. By providing the 
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value-added services, the customers’ willingness to pay will increase to .+v e
For ordinary customers, the consumer surplus obtained in the first period is
, and in the second period, it is . Therefore, the indifference +v e p    + 1v e s  
condition between the first and second period is: .  + + 1v e p v e s     
The conspicuous customers’ surplus of the first period is , and +v e k p  
that of the second period is . Therefore, the indifference condition   + 1v e s  
between the first and second period is: .  + + 1v e k p v e s       
Suppose the retailer only has one ordering opportunity. According to the 
analysis, the retailer has two pricing options: (1) Set a low price as
, with which, both the conspicuous customers and ordinary   + + 1v e v e s    
customers will choose to buy in the first period; (2) Set a high price as
, with which, the conspicuous customers will purchase   + + 1v e k v e s      
in the first period and the ordinary customers will wait until the second period.
The retailer’s expected profit when all customers buy in the first period:
.      (5)        31 min , min ,Q pE d Q s Q E d Q w e Q     
The retailer’s expected profit when only conspicuous customers buy in the first 
period:
.    (6)        32 min , min ,Q pE d Q s Q E d Q w e Q       
In the expected profit functions, the first term is the sales revenue in the first 
period, the second term is the residual revenue in the second period, and the third term 
is the procurement and value-added services costs.
The optimal equilibriums and proofs of three models are shown in the Appendix 
A.
4 Pricing decision analysis
In this section, we first analyze the optimal pricing decisions in three different 
models and further investigate the impact of quick response and value-added services 
on the pricing decisions.
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4.1 Optimal pricing decisions in three models
By comparing the profits in the two cases where all customers buy in the first 
period and only conspicuous customers buy in the first period, we summarize optimal 
pricing decisions of three models in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: There exists a conspicuous customer proportion , when *ia
 , we have  and the retailer should set a low price to *(0 ]i  ，    2 1i iQ Q 
make all customers purchase in the first period; when  , we have *( ,1)i 
 and the retailer should set a high price to make only conspicuous    2 1i iQ Q 
customers purchase in the first period, where  represent models 1, 2 or 3, 1,2,3i 
respectively.
(The proof of Theorem 1 and characterization of  are shown in Appendix *ia
B.)
Theorem 1 shows that no matter what strategy the retailer adopts, when the 
number of conspicuous customers is large, that is, , the retailer should set a *i 
higher selling price, otherwise the retailer should choose low price strategy. Because 
only when there are enough conspicuous customers in the market, a high-margin 
strategy can make up for the sales loss of ordinary customers. This finding provides 
an explanation for the practices in luxury industry. For example, in China where 
materialism and conspicuous consumption are much more obvious (Podoshen et al., 
2010), the prices of luxury goods are on average over 50 per cent higher than those in 
Italy and France, according to the “Global Powers of Luxury Goods 2017” report of 
Deloitte (Deloitte, 2017). Theorem 1 inspires luxury retailers in two aspects. On one 
hand, before making the pricing strategy, luxury retailers should do deep analysis of 
market conditions and customer consumption behavior, based on which the they can 
set different prices for the same product in different markets to maximize profits. On 
the other hand, for retailers who want to adopt a high price strategy, they can use 
advertisements or other publicity methods to induce consumers to buy products at 
once. For example, many retailers motivate consumers to buy immediately by 
showing a low inventory.
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4.2 The impact of strategy on pricing decision
In this section, we compare the threshold  of three models and propose *
Theorem 2, based on which we summarize the optimal pricing strategies and 
corresponding optimal profits under different proportions of conspicuous customers in 
Table 3. 
Theorem 2: comparing the thresholds of different pricing strategies of three 
models, we have .* * *2 1 3   
 (The proof of Theorem 2 is shown in Appendix C.)
Theorem 2 indicates that, with the conspicuous customers in the market, the 
quick response could induce the retailer to adopt high price while surprisingly, 
value-added services inhibit it. Quick response can only increase the willingness to 
pay of the conspicuous customers by reducing the probability of discounted sales. 
However, the value-added services increase the willingness to pay of all customers. In 
this way, target customers for quick response and value-added services should be 
conspicuous customers and all customers, respectively. Intuitively, luxury retailers 
that provide value-added services will have higher market positioning, therefore 
should set higher prices. Our finding shows it exactly oppositely. This provides an 
important insight for luxury retailers adopting value-added services such as L&C 
Leather Workshop: positing the products to all customers may be more profitable than 
market segmentation strategy.     
Table 3. Retailer’s optimal pricing strategies and profits. 
  *20   
* *
2 1   
* *
1 3   
*
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5 Analysis of quick response and value-added services
In order to obtain insights about optimal strategy, now we further compare the 
profits of three models with optimal pricing decisions. 
5.1 Analysis of quick response (model 1 vs. model 2)
This section compares the results of models 1 and 2 to determine whether retailer 
should respond quickly to deal with market uncertainty and the associated customer 
strategic behavior. 
Theorem 3:
1) in the case of , if ,we have , vice versa.*20   
I
q qw w 21 11 
2) in the case of  , if ,we have , vice versa.* *2 1   
II
q qw w 22 11 
3) in the case of , if ,we have , vice versa.*1 1  
III
q qw w 22 12 
Where .I II IIIq q qw w w 





shown in Appendix D.)
Figure 1. Optimal pricing decision and strategy by comparing the models 1 and 2.
Theorem 3 indicates the conditions for adopting quick response and the optimal 
pricing strategy in different situations. It can be seen intuitively from Figure 1 that, 
regardless of the proportion of conspicuous customers, it is advantageous to have 
quick response strategy only when the cost is low. The quick response grants the 
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retailer two opportunities to order in the first period, making the order quantity close 
to the actual demand in the first period. Thus, it decreases the necessity of selling 
goods at a discounted price, and reduces the losses of price reduction. But as the cost 
of the secondary ordering increases, the quick response strategy becomes less 
economical when the extra cost diminishes the benefits. This is of course in line with 
the managerial principle of companies.
Theorem 3 also shows that the higher the proportion of conspicuous customers in 
the market, the more incline retailers are to adopt a quick response strategy. More 
specifically, when the proportion of conspicuous customers is ( ), the cost *1 1  
threshold for taking quick response is the highest. The explanation is that the quick 
response can reduce the probability that the goods being sold in the second period by 
matching the supply and demand of the first period, so that the probability of stockout 
in the second period  becomes higher. As for the conspicuous customers, a high 
probability of stockout in the second period imposes a high psychological utility of 
purchasing immediately. In short, when more conspicuous customers exist in the 
market, the retailer can withstand a higher cost of quick response, motivating the 
retailer to adopt quick response strategy. 
An important managerial implication of Theorem 3 is that luxury retailers should 
adopt a combination of high price and quick-response strategies when there are more 
conspicuous customers. On the one hand, retailers can improve the willingness to pay 
of conspicuous customers through quick response, as the possibility of stockout in the 
second period can be higher. On the other hand, retailers can obtain the maximum 
surplus value of conspicuous customers by setting a high price. The existence of 
conspicuous customers will amplify the advantages of quick response strategy, which 
is a good explanation for some of the luxury brands mentioned in the introduction, 
such as Sandro and Maje, which have begun to incorporate the characteristics of 
luxury and fast fashion brands and adopted a quick response strategy.
5.2 Analysis of value-added services (model 1 vs. model 3)
This section compares the results of model 1 and 3 to determine whether the 
retailer should adopt value-added services. 
Theorem 4:
1) in the case of , if ,we have , vice versa.*10   
I  31 11 
2) in the case of ,if ,we have , vice versa.* *1 3   
II  31 12 
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3) in the case of , if ,we have , vice versa.*3 1  
III  32 12 
Where  .I II III   
 (The proof of Theorem 4 and characterizations of , and  are shown in I II III
Appendix E.)
Figure 2. Optimal pricing decision and strategy by comparing models 1 and 3.
Similar as in Theorem 3, Theorem 4 also shows that value-added services are 
beneficial only when the cost is relatively low. Different from Theorem 3, Theorem 4 
reflects that the existence of conspicuous customers will prevent the retailer from 
choosing value-added service strategy. As can be seen visually in Figure 2, when  
increases, the cost of value-added services needs to be reduced to a lower level to 
make value-added services beneficial. In the contrast, Figure 1 illustrates that as  
increases, even if the cost of quick response becomes higher, the quick response 
strategy can be profitable. Theorem 4 reminds traditional luxur  retailers that a focus 
on value-added services may result in profit reduction when there are more 
conspicuous customers in the market. For example, when conspicuous markets such 
as China become the fastest-growing regions for luxury consumption, some 
traditional luxury brands focusing on value-added services cannot adjust their 
strategies according to market conditions, resulting in huge profit losses. In 2016, 
sales of the famous luxury brand Prada declined by about 10% (Deloitte, 2018). 
5.3 Comparison of quick response and value-added services (model 2 vs. model 
3)
This section focuses on the retailer's profit comparisons when providing quick 
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response and value-added services, and analyzes the retailer's optimal strategy and 
pricing decision with different proportions of conspicuous customers. Therefore, we 
consider only the situation when providing value-added services or the quick response 
is better than the basic model, that is, the following analysis is based on  and Iq qw w
. III 
Theorem 5:
1) in the case of ,if ,we have , vice versa.*20   
I
  31 21 
2) in the case of , if ,we have , vice versa.* *2 3   
II
  31 22 
3) in the case of , if ,we have , vice versa.*3 1  
III
  32 22 
Where . 
I II III
   








Figure 3. Optimal pricing decision and strategy by comparing models 2 and 3.
Theorem 5 compares the profits of models 2 and 3. It can be seen intuitively 
from Figure 3 that there are three different thresholds for value-added service cost  
under different proportions of conspicuous customers. When the value-added service 
cost is lower than the thresholds, adopting value-added services outperforms the quick 
response strategy. However, when the proportion of conspicuous customers is very 
large, setting a high price with quick response strategy is more likely profitable than 
providing value-added services. Theorem 5 further indicates an important implication 
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for luxury retailers, that is, when there are more conspicuous customers in the market 
and the value-added services are relatively costly, they should try to learn from the 
fast fashion and adopt quick response, just like Sandro and Maje did.
6 Numerical simulation
In this section, we used MATLAB2016 software for numerical analysis to 
simulate the impact of some parameters on profits in order to discover new 
management findings. The basic data for the numerical analysis follows Tereyağoğlu 
and Veeraraghavan (2012). In this paper, the parameters are assigned as follows: 
, , , , , , ,  and .20v  5k  6s   2100 20N ， 2qw  2e  1  3   0,1 
6.1 The impact of value-added services on retailer’s profits
This part mainly analyzes the impact of the parameters on the retailer’s profits in 
model 3 (see Figure 4).












   













(a) The impact of  on .                 (b) The impact of  on .     3 e 3
            















(c) The impact of  on  3
Figure 4. The impact of value-added services on retailer’s profits. 
As can be seen from Figure 4, the retailer’s profit increases with the utility 
increase coefficient , the service level , while decreases with the cost coefficient  e
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of value-added service . This conclusion is relatively intuitive. When  or    e
increases, customers’ willingness to pay increases accordingly, so the retailer can 
specify higher prices to increase profits. While when the cost of value-added services 
increases, profits will decrease. 
6.3 The impact of other parameters on profits
In this section, we analyze the impact of other parameters such as sensitivity 
coefficient of stockout for conspicuous customers , the discounted price , and the k s
difference between full price and discounted price  on the retailer’s profits.p s


















Figure 5. The impact of  on the retailer’s profits.k
It can be seen from Figure 5: with the increase of the sensitivity coefficient of 
stockouts for conspicuous customers,  and  remain unchanged, whereas 11 21,  31
 and  increase. This phenomenon is also consistent with reality. When 12 22,  32
the sensitivity coefficient of stockouts for conspicuous customers is high, the 
conspicuous customer is willing to pay more (psychologically), and thus the retailer 
can set a higher price to increase profits.
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Figure 6. The impact of  on the retailer’s profits.s
As seen from Figure 6, with an increase in the discounted price, the profits of the 
retailer decrease. The discounted price has the greatest impact on the profit under the 
quick response, and has less impact on the profits under the basic model and 
value-added services. This gives some inspiration to the retailer that, in the case of 
quick response, the retailer should set a low discounted price, which promotes rapid 
sales of products and capital return, while in the case of value-added services, 
applying a discount price will not bring any significant improvement.
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Figure 7. The impact of  on the retailer’s profits.p s
As seen from Figure 7, with an improvement in the , the profits in different p s
models show different trends. Generally, as the increase of , the retailer's profits p s
will be increased. However, there are two exceptions in the basic model and the 
value-added services model when all customers are buying in the first period. In these 
two cases, the retailer's profits first increase then decrease, which suggests the retailer 
set a correct  value to maximize the profit.p s
7 Model extension
Considering that value-added services and quick response are not completely 
mutually exclusive, there is a trend in luxury industry to adopt both strategies as long 
as resources allow. Therefore, we model this situation and further investigate the 
relationship between these two strategies.
7.1 Model with quick response and value-added services (model 4)
The expected profits of the retailer in the two cases where all customers buy in 
the first period or only conspicuous customers buy in the first period are shown in 
Eqs. (7) and (8), respectively.
.       (7)           41 +qQ p w e E d w E d Q s w e E Q d  
        
.  (8)           42 +qQ p w e E d w E d Q s w e E Q d     
        
In these two equations, three terms on the right refer to the profits by satisfying 
all customers (or conspicuous customer only) in the first period, the additional cost 
due to quick response, and the profit obtained in the second period, respectively.
Similar to the models 1, 2 and 3, there is also a threshold , making a low *4
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price strategy is better when . The detailed analysis and proofs can be *4(0 ]  ，
found in Appendix G.
7.2 Impact of quick response and value-added services on *
Due to the complicated calculation results when considering two strategies at the 
same time, the following investigation of model extension is based on the numerical 
simulation with the parameter setting , , , , , ，20v  5k  6s  10w  2qw  2e 
， , . The comparisons of , ,  and  are 1  3   2~ 100 20d N ， *4 *1 *2 *3
shown in Figure 8.














(a) Model 1 vs. model 4.                     (b) Model 2 vs. model 4.







(c) Model 3 vs. model 4.
Figure 8. Comparasions of  in different models.*
Through the numerical examples we know that , with our * * *2 4 1   
parameter setting. Combined with Theorem 2, we have , with * * * *2 4 1 3     
which we can suggest the optimal pricing decisions for the retailer in four models, as 
shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Optimal pricing decisions in four models.
Observation 1:
The range of  to adopt a high price strategy is largest in the model 2 with 
quick response, while it is smallest in the model 3 with value-added services.
When the retailer adopts a high price strategy, only conspicuous customers will 
purchase in the first period. Recall that a high price strategy is optimal only when the 
proportion of conspicuous customers is high. Observation 1 shows that, the range of 
 to adopt a high price strategy is the largest in model 2. It further explains the 
important conclusion of this paper, that is, the quick response could induce the retailer 
to adopt high price while value-added services inhibit it. According to model 4, in this 
case quick response and value-added services bring positive and negative impacts, 
respectively. Therefore, we have . * * *2 4 3   
7.3 Impact of other parameters on the profit in model 4
In this section, we simulate the impact of the utility increase coefficient , the 
service level , the cost coefficient of value-added service  and the cost of quick e 
response  on the retailer’s profits in model 4. The results are shown in Figure 10. qw





















(a) The impact of  on .               (b) The impact of  on .     4 e 4
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(c) The impact of  on                 (d) The impact of  on      4 qw 4
Figure 10. The impact of parameters on retailers’ profits in model 4.
Figure 10 shows that, the retailer’s profit increases as the utility increase 
coefficient , the service level , and the cost coefficient of value-added service ,  e 
while decreases as the cost of quick response . The effect of ,  and  could qw  e qw
be intutively obvious. Interestingly, the profit changes in a reverse direction with . 
We now propose Observation 2. 
Observation 2:
When the retailer provides both quick response and value-added services, 
profits decrease with the cost of quick response, but increase with the cost of 
value-added services.
According to the analysis of model 3, when the retailer only provides 
value-added services, the profits decrease with the cost of value-added services. 
However, when both strategies are included, profits increase with the cost of 
value-added services. The explanation is that in this case the retailer could increase 
the price and therefore reduce the negative effect of increased costs. Whereas when 
only value-added services are provided, increasing the price will make more 
customers wait till the second period to purchase, and therefore resulting in losses. 
Since the losses are greater than the revenue gained from increasing price, the profit 
decreases as the cost of value-added services increases. However, when the retailer 
adopts the quick response at the same time, the quick response enhances the balance 
between demand and sales in the first period, thereby it reduces the probability of the 
sales at a discount, and subsequently it reduces losses. Therefore, the revenue from 
the increase in price at this time will be higher than the sales loss, so that the retailer's 
profit will increase with the cost of value-added services. In short, quick response can 
amplify the benefits of value-added services by controlling the probability of the 
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goods to be sold in the second period.
7.4 Comparisons of profits in the same price decision
In this section, we compare the retailer’ profits in models 2, 3 and 4. From 
section 7.2 we know that the optimal pricing strategies of different models are not the 
same. We use  to represent the situation of  , where the optimal 0.2  *2 
pricing strategies of above mentioned three models are the low price strategies; and 
 to represent the situation of  , where the corresponding optimal 0.9  *3 
pricing strategies are the high price strategies. At the same time, we make  to 10e 
satisfy the constraints in Theorem 5. The profits comparisons are shown in Figure 11.























(a) Profits comparisons with a low price    (b) Profits comparisons with a high price 
Figure 11. Profits comparisons of models 2, 3 and 4.
Through the profits comparisons, we find that no matter what pricing strategy is 
applied, the profit of providing both strategies is always higher than the profits when 
only one strategy is adopted. This shows that value-added services and quick response 
can bring an increase in profits when costs are relatively low. Therefore, the retailer is 
encouraged to combine two strategies at the same time when resources such as funds 
and personnel are sufficient. At the same time, it can be seen that when the 
value-added services cost is low, providing only value-added services is more 
profitable than providing only quick response. The abscissas corresponding to the 





5 respectively. We can see  in the figure, which verifies the Theorem 5.
III I
 
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8 Conclusion and management insights
8.1 Main conclusions
This paper studies the retailers' optimal pricing decisions with regard to 
conspicuous customers in the luxury industry when the retailer can provide quick 
response or value-added services. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows. 
First, the proportion of conspicuous customers plays an important role in determining 
the pricing strategy in a luxury market. When the proportion of conspicuous 
customers is lower than a threshold, the retailer should adopt a low price strategy, 
otherwise a high price strategy. Besides, the quick response could induce the retailer 
to adopt high price while value-added services inhibit it. Second, the customer 
conspicuous behavior can motivate the retailer to provide quick response. Therefore, 
when the proportion of conspicuous customers in the market is higher, the retailer 
tends to adopt a combination of high price and quick response strategies. Third, in the 
model extension, we find that providing two strategies together can bring greater 
profits to the retailer when costs permit and the existence of quick response can 
amplify the benefits of value-added services. Specifically, the retailer’s profits 
increase with the cost of value-added services when both strategies are provided, but 
the profits will decrease with the cost when only value-added services strategy is 
provided.
8.2 Management insights
The main conclusions of this paper include practical references for retailers who 
need to make decisions concerning conspicuous customers in a luxury market. First, 
the retailers should investigate the types of customers in the market, so as to form 
better pricing decisions and therefore maximize the profit according to the mix of 
customers. Second, considering more conspicuous customers in the market, the 
retailers should provide quick response, timely replenish products according to market 
demand, in order to reduce the possibility of goods being sold at a reduced price and 
obtain higher profits. Third, for the retailers with sufficient resources such as capital 
and manpower to adopt quick response and value-added services at the same time, 
both strategies should be included to maximize their profits. Moreover, when 
adopting a value-added services strategy, the company's out-of-stock probability in 
the second period should be controlled to amplify the benefits of value-added 
services.
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8.3 Limitations and future study
Although this paper analyzes the pricing decisions and service strategy decision 
for the retailers facing conspicuous customers in the luxury market, there are still 
some shortcomings in this paper. First, the supply chain structure considered in this 
paper only involves the retailer and customers; it does not consider the behavior of the 
supply side such as a manufacturer. In practice, the supplier's decision will also affect 
the retailer's pricing, and quick response also requires the support and cooperation of 
the supplier. Therefore, future research should extend to such supply chain structure. 
In addition, for the mode choices of luxury company, this paper considers the 
high-end luxury route and the phenomenon of transforming to “accessible luxury”. 
The parameters are relatively simple in the two models. The future research should 
collect more data to elaborate the choice behavior of the retailer and the customers, in 
particular the conspicuous customers, to further improve the retailer's decisions.
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Appendix A: Optimal equilibriums of the three models
Table A-1. Summary of the optimal equilibriums of the three models.
Model variables Case 1 (all customers purchase in the first period) Case 2 (only conspicuous customers purchase in the first period)
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We now show the proofs of optimal equilibriums. Taking Model 1 as an example, the 
retailer’s expected profit when all customers buy in the first period can be simplified into 
. Because , the price          11 min ,Q p s E d Q w s Q      F Q 
. By substituting  into  and finding the      1p v v s F Q v s s       p  11 Q












    
*
11Q w s
true in reality, especially in the garment industry. For example, during the product promotion 
season, companies will sell at a loss to reduce inventory and regain cashes. Substituting the  *11Q
into , we have . Substituting the  and  into , p   *11p w s v s s    *11Q *11p  11 Q





v sQ w s v s xf x dx
  
      
Similarly, the retailer’s expected profit when only conspicuous customers buy in the first 
period can be simplified as . The price     12 min ,
Q QQ p s E d w s  
 
     
 
. By substituting  into  and     1 Qp v k v s F v k s s 
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 
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, . The similar   *12p w s v k s s      
1
12 0
= ( )( ) ( )
w sF
v k sQ w s v s k f x dx 
  
       
processes are applied to the calculation of models 2 and 3. Thus, we complete the proofs of 
optimal equilibriums.                   
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
It is intuitive to see that the ,  and are strictly monotonically increasing in . 12 22 32 













v s xf x dx





   
 





Page 47 of 54
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tprs  Email: TPRS-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
35
 and  
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when , .*( ,1)i     2 1i iQ Q 
Then we complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2
 (1) We first compare the  and .*1
*
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 
 
is established. Therefore, we have .* *1 3 
* * *
2 1 3   
Then we complete the proof of Theorem 2.
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Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 3.
1) The proof of the first part of Theorem 3: when :*20   
Under this range of , the best pricing strategies of model 1 and 2 are both low price 
strategies. So we only need to compare the  and . Making ,  11 Q  21 Q    11 21Q Q 
we have .     =Iqw w s v s w s   
We take the first derivative of  with respect to ,  then we get  21 Q qw
, which shows that  decreases 





Q v s w s
E d Q




   
  
 21 Q
in . So, we have ,  When , we have ; when qw Iq qw w
I
q qw w    21 11Q Q 
, ；and when , .Iq qw w    21 11Q Q  Iq qw w    21 11Q Q 
2) The proof of the third part of Theorem 3: when : *1 1  
Similarly, let , we have . And    12 22=Q Q      =IIIqw w s v k s w s    
, which shows  decreases in 





Q v k s w s
E d Q
w w w s
 

   
   
  
 22 Q
. So, we have ,  When , we have ; when qw IIIq qw w
III
q qw w    22 12Q Q 
, ；and when , .IIIq qw w    22 12Q Q  IIIq qw w    22 12Q Q 
3) The proof of the second part of Theorem 3: when : * *2 1   
When , we have  and . And According to the first two * *2 1    21 22  11 12 
parts we know, regardless of , when , we have  and Iq qw w    21 11Q Q 
. When , we have . Recall that  decrease in 21 11 22    IIIq qw w 11 22 12     22 Q




q q qw w w 
II
q qw w
we have ; when , we have and when ,   22 11Q Q  IIq qw w    22 11Q Q  IIq qw w
. satisfies the equation   22 11Q Q  IIqw
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 
Then we complete the proof of Theorem 3.
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 4
1) The proof of the first part of Theorem 4: when :*10   





v sQ w s v s xf x dx
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Making when , we have , vice versa. I  31 11 
2) The proof of the third part of Theorem 4: when :*3 1  
Similarly,  decreases in . So, let , we have and only have ，which 32  32 12=  III 
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   
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, vice versa.32 12 
3) The proof of the second part of Theorem 4: when :* *1 3   
When , we have . And when ,we haveI  31 11 12( )
I     III 
. Therefore, we know . Recall that  31 32 12( ) ( )
III III      31 31( ) ( )
I III    31
decreases in , and  is changeless in . Therefore, we have , and there must have  12  I III 
, making . And when , we have , vice versa.  ( , )II I III   31 12  II  31 12  II
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Then we complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 5
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   


               
  
                
 
Appendix G: Analysis and proof of model 4
Model extension analyzes the retailer’s optimal pricing strategy when adopting quick 
response and value-added services at the same time. Similar in model 3, the retailer has two 
pricing options: (1) Set a low price as , with which, both the   + + 1v e v e s    
conspicuous customers and ordinary customers will buy in the first period; (2) Set a high price as 
, with which, the conspicuous customers will purchase in the   + + 1v e k v e s      
first period and the ordinary customers will wait until the second period. The retailer has two 
ordering opportunities in the first period. The unit cost of the first order is , whereas the unit w
cost of the secondary order is , where  refers to the extra cost due to quick response.qw w qw
When the retailer wants all customers to buy in the first period, the expected profit of the 
retailer can be simplified as:  
 
. Subsituting          41 min ,q qQ w w e s d Q w e s Q p w e w              
the  into it and finding the first derivative of the profit     + + 1p v e v e s F Q    
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function, we obtain: . Thus,  and   =
q
w e sF Q









w e sQ F
w e w s


   




w e s v s ep s
w e w s
 

   
 
  
When only the conspicuous customers purchase in the first period, the profit function of the 
retailer is:
.        42 min ,q qQ QQ w w e s d w e s p w e w        
            
 
Substituting into it and     + + 1 +Qp v e k v e s F v e k s s    

           
 





w e sQ F
w e w s


   




w e s v k s ep s
w e w s
 

    
 
  
We then obtain the profit when all customers purchase in the first period and the profit when 
only conspicuous customers purchase in the first period:







w e w s
q q
q
w s e v s ew w s e xf x dx s w e w
w w s e

     

   
     
    
            

,







w e w s
q q
q
w s e v s k ew w s e xf x dx s w e w
w w s e

       

   
     
     
            

Comparing the profits under low and high price strategy, we propose Theorem A-1:
Theorem A-1: There exists a conspicuous customer proportion ,when  , *4
*
4(0 ]  ，
we have  and the retailer should set a low price to let all customers    42 41Q Q 
purchase in the first period; when  , we have  and the retailer *4( ,1)     42 41Q Q 
should set a high price to let only conspicuous customers purchase in the first period.
The proof of Theorem A-1 is as follows. We can easily know that the is strictly  42 Q
monotonically increasing in . Let , than we have     42 41=Q Q 
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， 
   



















w e w s
q q
q
w s e v s ew w s e xf x dx s w e w
w w s e
w s e v s k ew w s e xf x dx s w e w





   







     
  
     
    
           
     
           


making when , ; and when , *4(0 ]  ，    42 41Q Q  *4( ,1) 
.                                                                                                     42 41Q Q 
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